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PATHOLOGICAL PATENTING:
THE PTO AS CAUSE OR CURE
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SY STEM Is
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABO UT IT.
By

Adam

B.

Jaffe

and

Josh Lerner.

Princeton and Oxford: Princeton

University Press.2004. Pp. ix, 236. $29.95.

Rochelle Dreyfuss*

INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act was last revised in 1952. The hydrogen bomb was ex
ploded that year, vividly demonstrating the power of the nucleus; in the
1
ensuing postwar period, the Next Big Thing was clearly the molecule.
2
Novel compounds were synthesized in the hopes of finding new medicines;
solid-state devices ex�loited the special characteristics of germanium and

other semiconductors; as investments in polymer chemistry soared, advice
to the college graduate soon boiled down to "one word ... just one word[:]
,4
...Plastics.'
Over the next half-century, things changed dramatically. "Better living
5
through chemistry" has begun to sound dated (if not sinister). Genomics
and computer science have come into their own. The molecule is still val
ued, but not so much for its reactivity as for its informational content. Even
the business of knowledge production has evolved.Once the border between

*

Pauline Newman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. B.A. 1968,
Wellesley College; M.S . 1970, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 198 1, Columbia. -Ed. I
am grateful to Richard Stewart for help on administrative law; Craig Nard and the participants in the
N.Y.U. faculty workshop for helpful comments; Deborah Katz, N.Y. U . Law School Class of 2007,
for research assistance; Nicole Arzt for technical support; and the Filomen D' A gostino and Max E.
Greenberg Research Fund for financial support. This Review was shaped by my experiences as a
member of two committees of the National A cademy of Sciences, one on Intellectual Property in the
Knowledge-Based E conomy and the other on Intellectual Property in Genomic and Protein Re
search and Innovation.
I.

RICHAR D RHODES, DAR K SUN: THE MA KING OF T HE HYDROGEN BOMB 498-512 (1995).

2.

See, e.g., JA MES LE FANU, THE RISE AND FALL OF MO DERN ME DICINE 159-86 (1999).

3.

P.R. MORRIS, A HISTORY O F T HE WORLD SE MICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 26--6 3 (1990).

4. THE GRADUATE (Embassy Pictures Corporation 1967); see also ROBERT w. CA HN, THE
COMING O F MATERIALS SCIENCE (2001) .
5.
See, e . g . , Judson Knight, E.l. du Pont de Nemours and Company: Better Things for Bet
ter Living Through Chemistry Campaign, in ENCYCLOPE DIA OF MAJOR MAR KETING CA MPAIGNS

522-26 (Thomas Riggs ed., 2000).
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6
science and technology was clear; now it is a blur. There are scholars who
patent fundamental research, and commercial firms that are run like aca
'
demic departments. And while knowledge has always grown cumulatively,
the relationship among inventions has become more complex as products
have become interoperable, functionality has converged, and markets have
8
globalized. With the character of inventiveness changing so drastically, the
need to reexamine the patent system has become evident. In the last three
years, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Academy of Sciences,
and even the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") have suggested that it is
9
time for reform. As I write, Congress is contemplating significant revision
io

of the system.

Given this context, Adam Jaffe

11

and Josh Lerner

12

have given us a won

derfully timely book-and also one that is beautifully executed. If Congress
is to reform the system, the public ought to understand its current failings.
Interest group politics have played an especially corrosive role in this field
because the law is complex and creates substantial economic benefits on
behalf of particularly well-organized parties. Further, as the authors note,
the "second class status" of patent law within the academy has meant that
the perspective usually provided by legal scholars has largely been absent
here (p. 161). Their book is a splendid antidote. It lays out the basic struc
ture of patent law in a manner that is sure to educate and intrigue both
readers unfamiliar with law and lawyers unfamiliar with the patent system.
It uses as examples patents on inventions that are accessible to even the con
genitally innumerate: the ubiquitous peanut butter and jelly sandwich, the
oxymoronic comfortable high-heel shoe, and (of course) the proverbial bet
ter way to "catch[] ... mammalian pests not exceeding 100 grams" (pp. 32,

52, 28). There is also a nice historical section demonstrating that there are
6.

See, e.g., Francis Narin & Dominic Olivastro, Status Report: Linkage Between Technol

ogy and Science, 21 RES . PoL'Y 237 (1992) (demonstrating the ever-closer tie between science and

technology).
7.

See, e. g., Dante Di Gregorio & Scott Shane, Why Do Some Universities Generate More

Start-ups than Others?, 32 REs. PoL'Y 209 (2003); Walter W. Powell, Networks of Leaming in
Biotechnology: Opportunities and Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowl
edge-Intensive Field. in EXPANDING T HE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION
POL ICY FOR T HE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 251 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) [hereinaf
ter EXPAN DING T HE BOUNDARIES].

8.

See, e. g. , Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse

Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002) (describing the need for the law to evolve in order to ac

commodate the kinds of reverse engineering needed to produce products for the current
technological environment).
9.
FE D. TRA DE Co MM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION : THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/IO/innovationrpt.pdf;
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACA DS ., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 2IST CENTURY (Stephen A.
Merrill et. al. eds., 2004), http:// www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf; U.S. PATENT
AND TRA DE MARK OFFICE , THE 2IST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN (2003), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan_03feb2003.pdf.
10.

See, e. g. , H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).

11.

Professor of Economics and Dean of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University.

12.

Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking, Harvard Business School.
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no easy answers and that the debates over the patent system are enduring
and cyclical (pp. 78-95).
Neither Jaffe, an economics professor at Brandeis University, nor
Lerner, who teaches finance and entrepreneurial management at Harvard
Business School, is a lawyer. As a result, there are small technical errors. As
specialists in the economics of innovation, however, the authors provide a
superb analysis of the trade-offs inherent in designing a system that protects
innovators from those who would free-ride on their investments but leaves
inventions accessible to those who would build upon earlier work. Their
book would make excellent supplemental reading for students in a patent
law or an innovation theory class. I can only hope that it will be studied by
policymakers.
Despite the title's reference to "discontents," the book projects an image
of pathology: according to the authors, thickets of strong but invalid patents
are raising transaction costs and creating a drag on innovation. Their diag
nosis is that these symptoms arise from the confluence of two congressional
moves that began in the mid-1980s: establishing the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to hear all federal patent appeals and underfunding the
PTO. Their proposed cure lies in improving the efficacy with which patent
validity is tested. This is a simple story, and keeping it simple may be the
best strategy for a book aimed at a lay audience. It is also fairly accurate.
There is, however, little to substantiate the assertion that bad calls by the
PTO and the Federal Circuit constitute the only plagues on patenting. In
fact, the problems go far deeper, raising questions about institutional compe
tence to grapple with the changing face of science. Nonetheless, the reforms
suggested have strong institutional implications. With some modification,
they could go a long way toward healing the system.
I. SYMPTOMS
No one can lay out a case more graphically than two empiricists. Their
core thesis is that the patent system has undergone a fundamental change in
the last twenty-five years and has done so across two dimensions. As their
figures illustrate, in that period, the number of patents skyrocketed (p. 12),
and the exclusionary power of these patents increased dramatically (pp. 105,
107).
The rise in numbers is troublesome on its own: the authors suggest that
as the volume of patents increases, it becomes more difficult to assemble the
rights needed to pursue lines of research or manufacture products. Thickets
of rights are especially problematic for new entrants (often the most vibrant
competitors), who must search through existing patents to determine how
free they are to operate. They cannot afford to pay for, or bear the risk of,
protracted litigation, so they are inclined to improvident settlement. And
because these firms lack patents of their own, they are unable to offer cross
licenses to those who sue them. The payments they are forced to make di
vert resources from research activities (pp. 13-15).
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But as bad as the raw numbers are, the problem is aggravated by the in
creased power associated with these patents. The authors demonstrate that in
the last two decades, the probability that a patent will be found valid and
infringed has risen substantially. Furthermore, there is greater likelihood that
permanent injunctions and substantial monetary damages will be awarded.
With increasing confidence in the efficacy of patent litigation, new business
strategies have emerged. Because patents are now more attractive than other
ways of appropriating the benefits of inventiveness (such as relying on first
mover advantages), firms that might once have allowed their advances to fall
into the public domain instead tie down new technologies with patents. Fur
thermore, the prospect of a rich award or settlement leads firms to look for
13
"Rembrandts in the Attic" to assert against their rivals. Indeed, there are
now "patent trolls"-firms whose only business is to hold up established
companies and force them to pay hefty fees (see, e .g . , pp. 56-64).
The result is a vicious cycle. The better patents are at protecting invest
ments in innovation, the more firms· rely on patents; the more evident it is
that patents are good sources of income; the more they are used as invest
ment vehicles. As the thicket of rights grows, it becomes harder to maneuver
without attracting litigation. Since the best defense is often a good offense,
14
firms patent to the hilt, creating a base for even more suits.
So far, so good. There is no reason to doubt that these numbers are accu
rate and worrisome. However, at the crux of the book is the claim that
improving examination will fix the system. For that to be true, the authors
must demonstrate not only that there are many more patents, but also that
these new patents are largely invalid. Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate
that claim because Jaffe and Lerner never say what they mean by invalidity.
Because subsequent arguments are mainly directed at the PTO and the Fed
eral Circuit-especially their failure to adequately consider earlier materials
("prior art") when determining patentability-the concern is presumably
with patents on advances that are not inventive as defined by statute or
precedent.
Understood this way, the authors' support is spotty. They furnish four
types of evidence. First, there are the anecdotes: they dwell on the peanut
butter and jelly sandwich patent (pp. 32-33), and also cite patents on Ama
zon's "one-click" checkout procedure (p. 75), a remote control that enables
a T.V. to display adjustment instructions (p. 121), a garbage bag that looks
like a jack-o' -lantern when filled (p. 122), and two methods for pricing expi
rationless options (pp. 145-46). These stories do make one wonder what is
going on in the Patent Office. However, none of the patents described is
likely to tax innovation heavily. Further, mistakes are sure to happen
indeed, the authors suggest (for reasons discussed below) that it would be
foolish to expend resources on too much accuracy at the earliest stage of

13.
See KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKN
I G THE
HI DDEN VALUE OF PATENTS (2000).
14.

A vivi d i llustration can be found on page 14.
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examination (pp. 174-75). But that means that the existence of some bad
patents does not tell us whether the system as a whole is sick.
The next two forms of evidence are comparative. The authors first con
sider data on validity and infringement before and after the 1980s, showing
that findings of validity have increased substantially (pp. 98- 107). This in
formation is suggestive, but before concluding that the marketplace is now
awash with bad patents, one needs to know whether the validity determina
tions in the earlier era were accurate. Perhaps courts were previously too
quick to invalidate patents. And, in fact, there is reason to think that in the
1970s, the research community believed that patents were offering insuffi
cient protection against free-riders; there may have been a flight to trade
secrecy that inhibited the flow of information and, in its own way, impeded
15
scientific progress.
The second comparison offered by the authors is between the rates of
growth of U.S.-origin patents in the United States and abroad. From these
statistics, the authors reason as follows:
If the examination standards in the United States were not changing, we
might expect successful applications in the United States by U.S.inventors
to grow at about the same rate as our measure of internationally important
inventions originating in the United States .... The fact that the growth in
successful PTO applications was, instead, twice as large as the growth of
international [counterparts] is hard to explain in any manner other than de
clining standards in the U.S. PTO, producing an ever-growing proportion
of U.S. patents the patent-holders themselves did not think merited patent

ing elsewhere. (p. 143)

Again, this is provocative. However, the inference that the excess U.S.
patents must be invalid is not so straightforward. National laws differ. For
example, inventors who publicly reveal information about their inventions
16
have a one-year grace period to file for U.S. patents. Because this is not so
elsewhere, a university professor who presents cutting-edge research at a
conference will be unable to acquire foreign rights, but could get a (valid)
U.S. patent. More important, the cost of worldwide protection is high: all
but the richest applicants must make choices. Since the U.S. market is more
likely to be a core source of business for U.S.-based inventors, some will file
17
only locally. Nor will this decision hurt them as much as Jaffe and Lerner
assume. Patenting is like playing chess: because of economies of scale and

1 5. See, e.g., Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 574-75 (1 980) (statement of Sidney A. Diamond, Comm'r of Patents
and Trademarks). The same baseline problem affects the claim that patent remedies are now too
strong. Pp. 1 10-15.

16.

35 u.s.c.§ l 0 2(b) (2000).

1 7.

See, e.g., Kara M. Bonitatibus, Comment, Community Patent System Proposal and Patent

Infringement P roceedings: An Eye Towards Greater Harmonization in European Intellectual Prop
erty Law, 22 PACE L. REv. 201, 210-11 (2001) (noting also the high cost of translation). Patentees

who file only locally can also opt out of publication. 35 U.S.C. §1 22(b)(2)(B) (2000).
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brand loyalty on the part of multinational buyers, one square (a single large
market) can control a large section of the board.
The last piece of evidence-published patents--demonstrates that prior
art citations can be low. This too is worrisome, but-again-not necessarily
a sign of pathology. The data, which are scattered throughout the book, are
drawn largely from business methods (e.g. , p. 145), where the recent advent
of patenting means that there is a thin literature on which to rely and a pau
city of materials at the PTO itself. But these problems cannot be generalized
to fields where patenting and publication have been the norm. Furthermore,
there is also nothing to say what the right number of citations is. More is not
necessarily better: if the applicant knows a "killer" cite, it can make more
sense to hide it in a long list than to omit it and incur the risk that the patent
will be unenforceable, antitrust laws will be violated, or the patent agent
8

will be suspended. 1

Quibbling about the evidence on validity is, however, something of a red
herring. The deeper problem is that the authors largely ignore the many
other factors contributing to the patenting explosion. They do admit that "in
an area as complex as patent law, there are always going to be decisions that
go the other way" (p. 125). Thus, they note that the Federal Circuit has cut
back on use of the so-called "doctrine of equivalents," which has historically
operated to expand the scope of patents beyond their literal meaning. But
while they (quite properly) make this observation about the doctrine of
equivalents in connection with the discussion of patent strength, they appar
ently miss its implication regarding the number of patents that issue. That is,
the authors do not appear to see that when the court restricts use of the
equivalents doctrine, the number of issuances is likely to rise as applicants
who learn that their claims will no longer be read to cover a wide range of
equivalents (and, indeed, that the court is also going "the other way" and
9
constraining the literal meaning of claims 1 ) begin to file many narrow pat
20
ents that collectively provide broad coverage. Of course, these patents may
be problematic-they too create thickets that raise transaction costs-but
the problem is not one of invalidity.
More generally, during the time period on which the authors focus, a
great deal happened in the sciences and in the relationship between science
and patenting. In 1980 alone, the Bayh Dole Act, which encourages univer
2
sities to patent government-supported work, created a new stakeholder; 1

18. See 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2000) (disbarment); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (antitrust liabiality); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unenforcability); In re Milmore, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 628 (Comm'r Pats.
1977) (suspension); 37 C.F.R. §1.56 (2004) (duty to disclose).
19. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Re
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
20. An applicant could file one patent with many claims but may be required to separate
them. 35 U.S.C. §121 (2000).
21.

35 u.s.c. §
§200--212 (2000).

Pathological Patenting

May 2006]

1565

Fred Sanger won the Nobel Prize for discovering how to sequence DNA;

22

Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen patented their recombinant DNA technol
23
ogy; and the Supreme Court extended patents to "anything under the sun
2
made by man." 4 These developments altered the nature of scientific discov
eries, the pace of invention, the structure of the creative industries, and the
25
productive capacity of individual scientists and technologists. For example,
2
rational drug development has largely replaced trial-and-error, 6 and Fred
Sanger's Nobel-winning discovery is now performed by graduate students
27
(and robots ). The impact on the patent numbers is obvious.
The authors understand that new technological fields open whole new
28
but there are other pressures as well. Structural changes

areas to patenting,

in the industry create new transactional opportunities-and therefore new
29
The accelerating pace of

demands for patents with which to transact.

change means that products and processes become obsolete more quickly.
As a result, patent holders sometimes need wider protection--or more pat
ents-to appropriate equivalent returns from their inventions. Because the
factors that determine validity (such as inventiveness and disclosure) turn on
3
the "person having ordinary skill in the art," 0 many more patents-valid
patents-will issue unless the capacity of the ordinary artisan in each field is
regularly reevaluated.
These developments also tax innovation in ways that go well beyond the
numbers. The near-merger of scientific advance with technological applica
tion erodes the lines the law once drew to protect basic science from

22. Frederick Sanger-Autobiography, http://nobelprize.org/chemistrynaureates/ 1980/sanger
-autobio.html (last visited February 20, 2006).
23.

U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979).

24.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447U.S. 303, 309 (1980).

25.

See, e.g., supra notes 6-9.

26.

See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches P harmaceuticals: Balancing

Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001U. ILL L. REV. 173, 189-93.

27. See, e.g., Pfizer, Genome:
genome.pfizer.com/learn_more.cfm.

The

Secret

of

How Life Works

(2003),

http://

28. See, e.g., pp. 115-19; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (software); Dia
mond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (genomics and proteomics). Indeed, another reason why
U.S. filings exceed foreign filings is because some of these new technologies are not considered
patentable elsewhere. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973,
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, available at http://www.european-patent-office.orgnegal/epc/e/ar52.html (busi
ness methods not patentable); Japan Patent Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility
Model in Japan pt. Vll, ch. I (2000), http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/Guidelines/
PartVIl-1.pdf (only computer-implemented business methods patentable). For a general discussion
of the differences among national filing practices, see Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property
Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37
IDEA 261, 275-78; 281-82 (1997).
29.

See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of

Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES, supra note 7, at 123.

30.

See 35 U.S.C. §
§103, 112 (2000).
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3
privatization. 1 University participation compounds the problem. The public
spillovers that their basic research once generated are now protected with
patents, patents that dominate broad swaths of inventive opportunities and
block follow-on research. Patents, in short, are issuing without regard to the
consequences of moving from rights in molecules to rights in information,
of shifting protection from end-products to fundamental relationships of
nature, or of changing the locus of inventive and patenting activity.
The real disease, then, is not merely invalidity, but rather the absence of
meaningful accommodation of the law to a shifting technological landscape.
Congress has revised the law in only minor respects, and· (until very re
32
While the

cently) the Supreme Court has not taken many patent cases.

Federal Circuit has gestured in the direction of keeping patent law current,
its efforts have been largely ineffectual. The court tackled the phenomenon
of patents over information products by clarifying the limitations of the
33
But barring virtually all uses of the in

common law research exemption.

formation contained in patents makes follow-on development more
3
difficult. 4 And because one of the research exemption decisions involved
35
use of a patented technology at a university, it is now arguably harder for
the academy to engage in the production and transmission of knowledge.
The court has also tried to contain broad-ranging patents by adapting the
disclosure requirement to limit patent scope, but that approach may be creat
ing even denser thickets of rights. Most startlingly, despite the quickening
3
pace of change, the court rarely revises the level of skill in specific arts. 6 To
the contrary, its scope decisions entrench low levels of skill, virtually guar
37
anteeing an explosion in (valid, but low-quality) patents.

31.
See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S . 519 (1966) (uti lity does not i ncl ude resear ch uses) ;
Funk Br os. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 1 31 (1948) ( handi work of nature unpat
entable) ; O'Reilly v. Mor se, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) (abstr act pri nciples unpatentable).
32.
See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Coun to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 273, 275. Thi s appear s to be changing, see, e.g., Medl mmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 ( Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3457 ( Feb. 21, 2006)
( No. 05-608) ; Mer cExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1 32 3 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cen. granted, 126
S. Ct. 7 33 (2005) ; Independent Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Wor ks, Inc., 396 F.3d 1 342 ( Fed. Cir. 2005),
vacated and remanded, 126 S . Ct. 1281 (2006) ; Metabolite L abor ator ies, Inc. v. L abor ator y Cor p.,
370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005).
33.
Matley v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1 351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (200 3) ;
Embrex, Inc. v. Ser v. Eng'g Cor p., 216 F.3d 1 343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
34.
In Merck KGaA v. lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2 372 (2005), the S upreme
Cour t inter preted a statutor y experi mental -use exception br oadly, but the exception applies onl y to a
narrow class of research wi thin the phar maceuti cal s sector.
35.
See Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (refusing to tail or ru les on
prior ity to pedagogi cal i nterests).
36.
Dan L . Burk & Mar k A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty P rinciple, 54 CASE W.
RES. L . REv. 691, 701--02 (2004).
37.
See, e.g., cases ci ted supra note 19 ; see also Hil ton Davi s Chem. Co. v. Wamer
Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir . 1997) (rel ating scope to skill i n the art).
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II. DIAGNOSIS
The authors do not have a particularly difficult time diagnosing the
source of the problems upon which they concentrate. Both the spurt in the
number of patents and the augmentation in their power began in the mid1980s, as two important changes were made in the patent system. In 1982,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was given exclusive jurisdiction
over federal patent appeals (pp. 107-26); beginning in the 1990s, the Patent
Office was turned into a "profit center" (p. 1 1)-it was initially required to
support itself out of filing, examination, and maintenance fees, and later told
that some of these fees would be diverted to the general revenue (pp. 13044).
In the authors' view, the concurrence of these events is especially lethal
(pp. 149-50). Fee diversion has impoverished the PTO, making it difficult
for the Office to search or examine prior art comprehensively. Further, the
PTO's profit orientation disposes it to grant its customer/clients' patents.
Nor are these patents invalidated when they get to court. Because the Fed
eral Circuit is so specialized and hears mainly from patent lawyers, there is
always a suspicion that, in the authors' words, the judges will "tum inward,"
be "swayed by a belief in the unique importance of the field," and be "prone
to [getting] 'captured' by those who benefit from [it]" (p. 103). Among the
examples of Federal Circuit actions too supportive of patents, the authors
cite the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of validity with clear
and convincing evidence, which they believe is inappropriate in light of the
deficiencies in examination (pp. 108, 152, 192-95), and the court's failure to
limit juries, which are "too easily swayed by a beribboned patent document"
(p. 124).
The authors' concerns about the PTO are seconded by other commenta
tors, including Rob Merges, who has made many perceptive observations
38
about the operation of the Office. It is also easy to be persuaded that a
bench immersed in patenting might adopt rules that are simple to apply and
review, even if these results happen to make it harder to attack validity. The
authors' example of In re Lee, the case about the television remote control,
39
is particularly well chosen. The invention incorporated two known fea
tures, and the PTO rejected the application on the ground that ordinary
artisans would have had the common sense to combine them. The Federal
Circuit's reversal, which requires the Office to demonstrate a specific sug
gestion to combine in the prior art, is a poster child for the quality problem:

38. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589-91 (1999); see
also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litiga
tion Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH.

39.

L.J. 943, 96� ( 2004).

In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 ( Fed. Cir. 200 2).
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in the name of facilitating review, the court essentially rejected use of common sense.40
The authors' straightforward diagnosis of the pathology in patenting is,
of course, extremely attractive, for it makes the prescription for a cure obvi
ous. It does not, however, fully account for the symptoms observed. For one,
it is not entirely accurate on its own terms. It is probably correct to blame
the Federal Circuit for strengthening patent remedies and for making it
harder to prove invalidity. But the court cannot be held responsible for such
factors as fostering jury trials or extending patents to new kinds of subject
matter.
With respect to jury trials, the authors are right that they too have

soared.4 1 And the Federal Circuit may be a cause, but only indirectly: it may
be that litigants, wary of the Federal Circuit's. expertise, choose jury trials
because their verdicts are perceived as harder to overturn than judicial find
ings. But there is not much that the Federal Circuit can do about that. The
2
right to a trial by jury is grounded in the Constitution4 and. the law allocat

ing decisionmaking authority and setting standards of review is virtually all
3
of the Supreme Court's making.4 Ironically, the Federal Circuit once did try
to write its own law on an issue of review, but the Supreme Court summarily
4
reversed.4
As to expanding patentable subject matter (pp. 115-19), the Federal Cir
cuit had an even smaller role to play. In fact, the default rule changed: at one
time, new technologies were regarded as unpatentable unless Congress acted
to extend protection to them; now new technologies are patentable unless

Congress says no. But the Supreme Court effectuated that change (in Dia
45
mond v. Chakrabarty ), not the Federal Circuit. Similarly, it was the
46
Supreme Court (in Diamond v. Diehr ) that extended patents to software.
While the authors are right that Diehr did not go as far as the Federal Circuit
in approving patents on software and business methods (p. 1 16), the Court

40. Id. at 1345 ("[Case law] did not hold that common knowledge and common sense are a
substitute for evidence, but only that they may be applied to analysis of evidence.").
41.

The authors provide another wonderful graphic on page 123.

42.

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

43.
The authors' treatment of Markman v. Westview lnstrnments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), is
particularly curious. They claim it expands the scope of jury trials, p. 124, when it contracts it,
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372; they cite it as a Federal Circuit case, pp. 124 n.115 & 196 n.223, when it
was reviewed (and affirmed) by the Supreme Court. Similarly, they attribute the standard for review
ing a jury verdict to the Federal Circuit's decision in Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226
(Fed. Cir. 1989), p. 124 n.116, even though that decision explicitly depends on Supreme Court
precedent, Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1235.
44.
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam) (rejecting the
Federal Circuit's construction of FED. R. C1v. P. 52(a) to allow it to reverse a trial court finding of
obviousness).
45.

447 U.S. 303 (1980); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Story o/Chakrabarty: Technological

Change and the Subject Matter Boundaries of the Patent System, in INTELL ECTUAL PROPERTY STO

RIES (Jane C. Ginsburg and Rochelle C. Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
46.

450U.S. 175 (1981).
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left the law in a state that was clearly unworkable; extending protection
7
more broadly was not an irrational way to fix it.4
Further, while one could plausibly believe that some specialized courts
could become biased, it seems unlikely that bias is the cause of the problems
at the Federal Circuit. Not all the Federal Circuit's judges are ex-patent law
9
8
yers,4 the docket is not entirely composed of patent cases,4 and not all the
patent cases on the docket are brought by lawyers whose business is prose
50
In infringement actions, both sides are often well-financed,

cuting patents.

enjoy the advantages of repeat play, and (because the patent bar is not split
51
along plaintiff/defendant lines) have access to the same representation.
B ecause knowledge is cumulative, even those who invest in invention do
52
not, in the long run, benefit from laws too protective of patent rights.
Finally, as we have seen, many other things were happening at the time
patenting was proliferating. The scientific enterprise restructured so signifi
cantly that major

developments in patent jurisprudence

should

have

occurred: not only updating "skill in the art," but also maintaining the law's
coherence in a shifting technological environment-reevaluating the rela
tionships between the pace of invention, claim scope, and patenting activity
as well as reexamining the effect of upstream patenting on follow-on inven
tion. To be sure, the authors occasionally acknowledge that the real issue is
not invalidity but patents that ought to be invalid because they represent mi
nor advances (e.g., p. 12). However, they are strangely resistant to the notion
that dramatic changes in science may require fundamental reconsideration
of patent doctrine (pp. 198, 199, 202-05). A more nuanced critique would
acknowledge the problems posed by technological change and ask why
there has been so little effort to keep law abreast with it.
After all, things did not start out that way. The Federal Circuit was estab
lished for the express purpose of creating the expertise needed to bring
coherence to patent law. In its early years, the court certainly appeared to un
derstand itself to be playing that special role. Realizing that administering a
field as fact-intensive as patent law would require the articulation of new poli
cies and doctrines in a factual context, the court fashioned rules that allowed
47.

See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW

608-13 (2d ed.

2004).
48.
See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Judicial Biographies (Jan. 25, 2005),
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html.
49.

See 28 U.S.C. §1295 (2000) (court's docket extends to matters other than patents).

50. SeeU.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pend
ing During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 2004, http://www.fedcir.gov/
pdf/aosep04.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (of 1,201 cases pending on Sept. 20, 2004, 364 arose
from District Courts and fifty-six from the PTO).
See, e. g. , Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
51.
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1989).

52. Some of the authors' favorite bad patents were, in fact, invalidated or narrowed by the
court. In re Kretchman, 125 F. App'x 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (the sandwich patent, dis
cussed on pages 32-34); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.corn, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (one-click, discussed on pages 74-75).
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it to give close scrutiny to all aspects of the decisions it reviewed.

53

But the

Supreme Court refused to see things that way and instead required the Fed
eral Circuit to accord the usual level of deference to district court (and later,
s
to certain PTO) factual decisions. 4 Since that time, the court has been un
able to come to terms with such a circumscribed role over fact-based
ss
issues. But as an appellate court, it has been neither fish nor fowl-neither
a supreme court of patent law, nor one among many circuit benches.
Of course, it cannot really be a supreme court. Because its rulings are
binding everywhere, the Federal Circuit is unable to let matters percolate
among the circuits and learn from the way differing doctrines play out in
different regions of the country. But the court has also failed to adopt other
methods the Supreme Court uses to improve the law. It does not ask the par
ties for so-called Brandeis briefs that would provide it with empirical data
bearing on the potential impact of its actions. Nor does it find vehicles to
perform "damage control"---cases that would allow it to examine how its
rules are working, explicate their limits, and revise those that prove prob
lematic. Instead, the court routinely instructs lawyers that the best briefs are
s
those that stick to the facts of the case. 6
At the same time, the Federal Circuit does not behave like other appel
late courts. Because its jurisdiction rarely overlaps with the other circuits'
and because it is relatively immune to Supreme Court scrutiny, it does not
need to offer elaborate policy-based rationales to justify the doctrines it
adopts. Isolated from the rough and tumble of debate, some of the jurists
appear to have developed rather thin skins. Thus, while scholarly commen
tary might have substituted for Brandeis briefing or sister-circuit debate,
s7
Similarly,

there are judges who are uncomfortable with academic critique.

lawyers worry that rearguing issues previously decided injures their capacity
58
The result is a "repeat-player disad

to represent their clients effectively.

vantage" that makes it hard for experienced lawyers to help the court engage
in the kind of reevaluation needed to make good law. It is, for example, sug
gestive that although the PTO is rumored to be uncomfortable with In re

Lee, it has not taken on a case challenging it.

53.

See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 51, at 8-25.

54. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (requiring the level of deference mandated
by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706 (2000) , to PTO patent denials); Dennison Mfg.
Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (I 986) (per curiam) (requiring the court to apply the "clearly
erroneous" standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
55. See, e . g . , Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330-35 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the court should stop reviewing factual issues under the "delusion" they are
legal questions).
56. Cf Robert H. Mayer, Remarks at the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit 20th Anniversary Judicial Conference (Apr. 8, 2002), in 217 F.R.D. 554 (2003) (noting that
the court has moved away from a policymaking approach).
57. See Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholar
ship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L. REv. 667 (2002).
58. Cf Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (criti
cizing counsel for arguing Fifth Circuit precedents contrary to Federal Circuit law).
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Of course, none of this would matter if the Supreme Court exercised its
normal supervisory role. Recently, the Court has stepped up review of Fed
9
eral Circuit cases, perhaps with this goal in rnind. 5 But specialization ties its
hands. Without circuit splits, lawyers seeking review rely on pre-Federal
Circuit appellate opinions or old Supreme Court precedents. It is, however,
6()
hard to be persuasive with aged case law. The Supreme Court is also con
founded by the reluctance of lawyers to reargue decided issues. For
example, the Court did not review Madey

v.

Duke because its procedural

posture made the common law research exemption at issue in the case diffi
1
cult to reach. 6 Another opportunity for review arose quickly in Integra v.
Merck but the appellate attorney avoided the issue, relying instead on a
2
statutory exemption tailored to the pharmaceutical industry. 6 The result is
that the law on research uses of patented materials now benefits only one of
3
the many technology sectors characterized by cumulative innovation.6
There is yet another problem for the Supreme Court: it can only improve
patent jurisprudence if its decisions are interpreted correctly. The Federal
64

Circuit's thin skin may make that difficult.

Congress may also be contributing to the strengthening of patent rights
and the disarray in the law. As noted earlier, interest group politics tends to
focus Congress on the benefits of intellectual property protection, not on its
costs. Thus, it is not insignificant that the changes the authors observe in
patenting are mirrored by legislative moves to expand the coverage and
5
strengthen the benefits of copyright and trademark protection.6 Congress'
interest in patents may additionally derive from the way that the economic
numbers are measured. Because patents on end-products convert consumer

59.

See Duffy, supra note 32, at 283.

60. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 119 F.
App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1350) (claiming a split with Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S.
273 (1976), which announced a rule that was unworkable from the moment the case was decided).
61. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Duke Univ. v. Matley, 538 U.S.
959 (2003) (No. 02-1007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/2002l 007 .pet.ami.inv.html.
62. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874-76 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (noting the role of the common law exemption), vacated and remanded,
123 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
63. See Merck KGaA v. lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (interpreting 35
U.S.C.§271(e)( l ) (2000)).
64. See, e. g. , lndep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (taking an arguably crabbed view of the Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence), vacated
and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (noting tenuous interpretation of Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem Co. , 520 U.S. 17, 34 (1997)); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi
lnstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1035, 1055 (2003) (noting
"resistance" to Dickinson v. 'Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999)).
65. See, e. g. , 15U.S.C.§l 125(c)-(d) (2000) (creating rights to prevent dilution and cyberpi
racy of trademarks); 17 U.S.C. §106(6) (2000) (extending copyright to audio transmissions); 17
U.S.C. §106A (2000) (creating rights of attribution and integrity for certain copyrighted works);
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000) ) (protecting copyrights in digitized works).
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surplus, which is not easily measured, into producer surplus, which is
monetized, lawmakers interested in creating the appearance of a strong
economy will prefer strong patents. Of course, patent protection will often
be a wash from the domestic viewpoint (since the profits patentees make are
experienced as costs to those who use patented inputs66); the international
perspective is different. The United States is a net technology exporter. Ac
cordingly, strong patents (including strong rights for Americans abroad)
improve its balance of payments. Thus, it is not surprising that comparable
moves are underway in other countries-some as a result of internal forces,
but often in response to efforts by the United S tates to strengthen rights for
7
Americans abroad.6
•

This is not to say that the authors are completely off the mark in their
diagnosis (or, as we shall see, their proposed cure). Jaffe and Lerner are
right to suspect that the problem is one of institutional design, albeit not of
the sort they posit. The Federal Circuit was arguably a grand experiment in
shifting responsibility for keeping the law coherent from Congress to the
Judiciary, but experience shows it was poorly structured. Creating a special
ized appellate court can promote uniformity, but not, in this context,

coherence. Without percolation or dialogue, perfecting the law is difficult;

because the core issues in patent law are mixed questions of fact and law
(What should ordinary artisans be deemed to know? What should the art be
deemed to teach?), a court tied to an appellate role is poorly suited to the
task of crafting doctrine in response to exogenous developments.
III. CURE
Despite its limitations, Innovation and Its Discontents makes a valuable
contribution. Even if not all patent problems are about invalidity, low
quality patents are a high-priority issue and the authors' recommendations
are insightful. And even if the diagnosis is incomplete, the proposals may,
with modification, restore health to the system.
The authors' starting point is Mark Lernley's observation that compre
hensive examination of every application is misguided because many
8
patents are never exploited. 6 Their system devotes increasing resources to
examination as the importance of an invention is clarified. It begins with
pre-grant opposition, proceeds to postgrant reexamination, and ends with a
revamped trial procedure (pp. 181-86, 191-97). Variants on this approach
9
have been suggested previously, 6 but the authors explain how these stages
interrelate, justify the contours of each stage, and, in the process, provide

66.
Indeed, patents create deadweight losses because there will be consumers who value the
product at the competitive price who will not buy it at the price charged by the patentee.
67.
See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PuBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF IN
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
68.
(2001).
69.

Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1497
See, e.g., proposals cited supra note 9.
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criteria for evaluating competing schemes. As they admit, however, the devil
is in the details (p. 186)-and not all their details are fully specified or
workable.
Pre-grant opposition takes direct aim at the PTO's problems searching
prior art. Although denominated an "opposition," this would be an ex parte
process, and, as such, it is nicely balanced to provide third parties with op
portunities to furnish examiners with reference materials without creating
opportunities for dilatory practice. There is not, however, much that is new
70
here: the PTO already has such a procedure, albeit of narrow scope. And
71
even if submission practice is improved, this stage is not likely to have a
dramatic impact on quality. The small possibility of stopping a patent "on
the cheap" does not provide much incentive to study applications as they are
published.
Postgrant reexamination allows challengers to formally argue for invali
dation. This inter partes procedure would entail the use of more resources,
but because these resources would be devoted to patents considered signifi
cant enough to oppose, the added expense will not be wasted. Indeed, the
value will be amplified, for if postgrant review operates effectively, it will
set up a "virtuous cycle" and discourage the filing of unworthy applications
(p. 185). Unfortunately, the details of this stage are not fully elucidated. The
authors do not specify the standard of review, nor do they say how long the
period for reexamination would last. These are important points because the
burden of proof and the time period allowed for opposition balance the in
terest of inventors in stable rights against the public's interest in detailed
scrutiny of the patent. Nonetheless, the authors make several useful sugges
tions. They would set the fee at around $50,000---low enough to attract
users but sufficient to deter frivolous challenges and to create a good proxy
72
for value (pp. 188-89). Unlike the current postgrant review procedure, the
estoppel effect of a decision is nicely set to protect the victorious patentee
without discouraging use of the process. They also recommend the ap
pointment of a specialized group of "reexaminers" to hear reexaminations
within the PTO (p. 188).
The next test of the patent would be at trial. Here, the recommendation
has two components. First, there is the burden of proof. Although the au
thors believe it is now too high, they would not change it if reexamination
were instituted. In their view, adopting a preponderance of the evidence
standard is dangerous because validity would become so uncertain that in
centives to invest in innovation would diminish. Besides, if a patent
withstands reexamination, it deserves a strong presumption. The authors
would also give the benefit of a strong presumption to any patent that has

70.
See 37 C.F.R. §l.99 (d) -( e) (2005) (providing a short period in which prior art can be
submitted, but forbidding the submitter to explain how the art submitted is relevant to the decision
on whether to grant the patent).
71.

See H.R. 2795, supra note 10 , sec. 10 ( pre-grant submissions).

72 .

35 u.s.c.§
§3 11-318 (2000) .
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not been subject to reexamination, this time on the theory that if no one tried
to challenge the patent, an inference can be drawn that it must be valid.
In many ways, this approach is odd. It assumes that the burden of proof
in reexamination would be set to provide a meaningful opportunity to in
validate the patent and that challengers would have as long as they need to
ask for reexamination. But if that is so, then reexamination could create as
73
More important,

much uncertainty as lowering the burden of proof at trial.

the inference that un-reexamined patents are valid assumes there are strong
incentives to oppose. This is true in Europe, but that experience may not be
transferable. The European Patent Office issues a bundle of national patents;
the only way to "centrally attack" them is through post-grant opposition.
Once that period lapses, challenges must be made in each country individu
7
ally. 4 B ecause U.S. issue preclusion rules tum every challenge into a central
75
attack, reliance on PTO procedures will likely be less prevalent here. In
some ways, the better approach would be to lower the burden of proof with
respect to new evidence and retain the current standard for material re
viewed by the PTO in examination or reexamination. Such a rule would
have the added benefit of encouraging applicants to disclose what they know
to the PTO.
The other recommendation is to eliminate juries. Noting that the Su
7
preme Court recently assigned claim construction to the court, 6 the authors
reason that validity can now also be tried to the bench: "It would be entirely
feasible for the judge to 'construe' the novelty and obviousness of the pat
ented invention . . . just as the judge 'construes' the claims . . ." (pp. 19697). But there is no magic in the word "construe"-the Supreme Court allo
cated claim construction to the court because it recognized the "importance
77
But uniformity is exactly what is not needed on validity.

of uniformity."

The essence of the authors' proposal is to leave validity open for continuous
reevaluation. In a sense, then, it is surprising that the ultimate recommenda
tion is not to channel validity challenges that arise in litigation back to
postgrant reexamination, where they can be decided by expert reexaminers,
subject to appellate review.
But despite these weaknesses, this is an artfully designed proposal. It
does, however, raise questions: If it is true that Congress has an independent
interest in strong patents, will it act on the recommendations the authors put
forth? If it does, will the observed pathology in the system be cured?

The postgrant opposition contemplated by H.R. 2795 is heavily contested, partly because
73.
it proposes lowering the burden of proof and partly because the nine-month window for opposition
is supplemented by a period to protest after infringement is alleged. H.R. 2795, supra note 10, sec.
9 , § 323.
74.

Convention on the Grant of European Patents arts. 99-1 12, supra note 28.

See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill . Found., 402 U.S. 3 13 ( 197 1) (once a
75.
patent is invalidated, nonmutual issue preclusion prevents the patentee from ever asserting it again).

7 6.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 5 17 U.S. 370 ( 199 6).

Id. at 390. In addition, the Court thought the historical evidence on construction was
77.
mixed. Id at 388.
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We may soon know whether Congress has the will to improve patent
quality, for there is at least one bill pending that includes both an ex parte
submission procedure and an inter partes opposition before a panel of ad
ministrative judges, using the preponderance of the evidence standard and
78
providing a narrow scope of estoppel -in other words, a system that essen
tially builds upon the one Jaffe and Lerner suggest. Whether the bill actually
becomes law may depend on whether the book manages to convince law
makers to recognize the downside of patenting.
The authors' efforts may be aided by the many patent scholars now
poised to present their perspectives. The involvement of academia in the
patenting arena may, however, also complicate matters because universities
have unleashed a new force-the technology transfer officer. These officers
style themselves as the voice of academia, but their interests align with pat
ent holders. Indeed, their views can be particularly perverse. They enjoy the
advantages of patenting (fees earned from faculty patents), but they see none
of the costs: faculty pay for their use of patented inputs from their research
grants. Further, despite Madey, most schools continue to use patented mate
79
rials without authorization;
technology transfer officers bear no
responsibility to limit infringement liability.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the situation is now so critical that
Congress may well intervene. However, enacting the pending reforms will
not substitute for an institution competent, over the long haul, to create co
herent law responsive to technological advancement. Congress does not
work quickly enough or at the level of detail required to perform that role.
Indeed, to those who perceive the quality problem as about more than inva
lidity, the current bill, although the most comprehensive legislation of the
last half-century, is disappointingly nonsubstantive. It does not, for example,
8
deal with the issues of inventiveness, scope, or follow-on research. 0
If Congress is unable to act and specializing appellate litigation impedes
both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, then the only actor left
standing is the PTO. The problems Jaffe and Lerner observe may make the
PTO appear an unlikely candidate for curing patenting problems. But in
many ways, the patent system presents a classical case for administrative
management. The law is technical and complex; it requires reconciliation of
conflicting policies and the statute fails to clarify the appropriate accommo
8
dations. 1 When the Federal Circuit was created, deference to agency
lawmaking generally, and to the PTO in particular, were not well under
stood. But in Chevron

U.S.A.

v. Natural Resources Defense Councif2 and

78.

H.R. 2 795, supra note 10 , secs. 9-10.

79.

See John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and

Material Transfers, 309 Sci. 2002 (2005) ( finding that only five percent of academic scientists check

for patents on research inputs).
80.

H.R. 2795, supra note 10.

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 83 7 , 865 (1984)
81.
(delineating the circumstances when courts should defer to administrative agencies).

82 .

Id.
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8
the Supreme Court clarified both issues. 4 Accordingly,

greater delegation of authority to the PTO should now be considered.
There is much about the PTO that makes this a desirable course. With its
thousands of examiners, many of whom hold advanced degrees in the pre
85
cise areas where they work, its resources outstrip the Federal Circuit's.
Turnover is high, but the continual need to hire brings in scientists fresh
from the field. The PTO also stays abreast of developments by holding train
ing

sessions with outside experts and through notice-and-comment
8
rulemaking. 6 In re Lee is also suggestive: in that case, the PTO rejected the
application; the patent issued because the Federal Circuit reversed its deci87
SlOn.
•

Admittedly, there are several impediments to according greater defer
ence to the PTO. Some are legal. Chevron deference rests on a presumption
of congressional delegation and requires that the agency's actions have the
88
force of law and offer opportunity for public input. Careful consideration
needs to be given to each of these requirements. Although the force-of-law
requirement may be satisfied when the PTO interprets the statute in the
course of entertaining patent applications, the Office's expertise will likely
be utilized most effectively through rulemaking. However, the absence of
explicit rulemaking authority and the long history of denying deference may
be enough to rebut the presumption of congressional delegation. Moreover,
the ex parte procedures used in the PTO, even when coupled with the vari
ous forms of outside participation currently available, are likely insufficient
89
Other impediments are practical.

to satisfy the public-input requirement.

The Federal Circuit appears resistant to the idea of according substantial
90
deference to the PT0. More important, the PTO's managerial difficulties

83.
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 ( 1999) (describing circumstances in which courts
should defer to decisionmaking by the PTO) .
84.
See generally STEPHEN G . BREYER ET AL ., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 289-90 (5th ed. 2002).
85.

R ai, supra note 64, at 1068-69.

86 .
See, e.g., P atent and T rademark Office, Dep't of Commerce, R equest for Comments on
Interim G uidelines for Examination of P atent Applications Under the 35 U.S .C. 1 12 '11 1 ''Written
Description" Requirement, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,639 ( June 15 , 1998), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/sol/og/1995/week26/patreqs.htm.
87.
In re Lee , 277 F.3 d 1338 ( Fed. Cir. 2002 ) ; see also In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3 d 994 ( Fed.
Cir. 1999) ( reversing rejection of the pumpkin/garbage bag patent). The P T O's assessment of its
error rate is far lower than the book suggests. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT AND TRA DE MAR K OFFICE,
PERFOR MANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2 004, at 17 (2004), http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2004/2 004annualreport.pdf (5.3 %) .
88.
United S tates v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 2 18, 226--27 (2001). See generally T homas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron 's Domain, 89 GEO. L .J. 833 (2001) .
89.
Even if Chevron deference is denied, the PTO may be entitled to ( somewhat lesser)
deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 ( 1944) . See Merrill & Hickman, supra note
88; see also United S tates v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 2 18 (2001) ( according Skidmore deference when
Chevron deference held inappropriate).
90.
For example, in In re Fisher, 42 1 F.3 d 1365 ( Fed. Cir. 2005 ) , the Federal Circuit affirmed
the rejection of a patent application on a series of gene fragments on utility grounds, finding that the
decision of the Board of P atent Appeals and Interferences was supported by substantial evidence.
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and practices have created a strong public perception that it favors patentees.
91
For example, applicants are actually called "customers" and the method for
29
overseeing examiners tends to reward grants over denials.
In this connection, the Jaffe and Lerner proposals assume new signifi
cance. On the legal side, the procedures they envision create broad
opportunities for public involvement, thereby arguably qualifying PTO deci
sions for Chevron deference. The new procedures suggested by Jaffe and
Lerner would also improve operations within the Office, making its deter
minations worthy of that respect. For example, the reexaminer post would
add a new rung to the career ladder, allowing the PTO to retain knowledge
able examiners

while leaving room to recruit new scientists. These

reexaminers would be important sources of new law. Their expertise as sci
entists and their experience as examiners would sharpen interpretation of
factual matters dispositive of patent quality (such as skill in the art, the im
plications of disclosures and references, and the likelihood that those in the
field would combine references) or implicit in patent policy (such as where
in the invention pipeline patenting belongs). Furthermore, their caseload
would position them to make adjustments as they see how the rules play out
(for example, how claim scope affects claiming strategies). Initial examina
tions would also benefit. Decisions made within the Patent Office would
quickly disseminate to the examining corps. The immediacy of review and
the possibility of having decisions overturned would also counteract the
propatent managerial biases currently affecting the allowance rate. Finally,
the law enunciated in reexamination would lead to improved rulemaking.
Other changes would clearly be necessary. To assure the PTO a role in
shaping patent jurisprudence (and to avoid conflicts between decisionmak
ers), Congress should expressly instruct courts to accord the PTO the
deference given to federal agencies generally. Congress would also be re
quired to abandon self-financing and fee-diversion. The PTO must be
perceived to be neutral and in possession of the resources needed to protect
the public interest in the public domain. Indeed, the fee structure should be
accomplishing substantive goals: application fees should be low enough to
attract patenting by all inventors and maintenance fees should be high
enough to encourage abandonment of noncommercial patents. If the PTO is
to shape policy, it will need experts outside of science, particularly in eco
nomics, to help understand the dynamics of innovation and the impact of
patents on individual technologies. It could also benefit from opportunities
However, there was no discussion of the possibility for agency deference; the court explicitly stated
that the Utility G uidelines the Board applied were "not binding . . . but may be given judicial no
tice," id. at 1372 (quoting Enzo B iochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3 d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir.
2002), and ended its opinion by saying that the "public policy considerations" involved in deciding
whether gene fragments were "useful" within the meaning of § 10 1 of the P atent Act was "more
appropriately directed to Congress," id. at 1378.
9 1. See, e.g., U.S. P atent and T rademark Office, Customer P rofiles, http://www.uspto.gov/
main/profiles/customerprofiles.htm (last visited Dec. 3 , 2005).
92.
Merges, supra note 38, at 607 ; see also G regory Aharonian, How To Subscribe, INTER
NET P ATENT NEWS SER V., http://www.patenting-art.com/clients/patnews.htm ( last visited Nov. 7,
2005) ( collecting complaints about the PTO).
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to consult officially with its counterparts in other countries. But the funds
added to support these operations would, in effect, do triple duty. They
would create the "virtuous cycle" Jaffe and Lerner envision, and also pro
duce a new institutional capacity to interpret public law.
Of course, there would still be an important role for the Federal Circuit.
It would review infringement decisions, but would have greater opportuni
ties (and factual input) with which to fully consider the issues that arise in
that context, such as the appropriate breadth of patents in light of rapid ob
solescence and the correct role for a research defense in light of the needs of
follow-on inventors. It would, of course, also continue to review the PTO.
CONCLUSION
The authors diagnose the recent proliferation of strong patents as symp
tomatic of a problem in the way the system is administered: by an agency
supported by patent seekers and by a court overly-focused on patenting. The
confluence of an explosion in patenting, the Federal Circuit's establishment,
and the PTO's financial restructuring is provocative. However, when these
events occurred, equally dramatic shifts were happening in the organization,
methodology, and production of science. Because these changes altered the
factual bases on which patent law is grounded, a strong argument can be
made that the observed problems are not caused merely by the implementa
tion of the law, but also by its articulation: by an institutional failure to keep
patent law and policy abreast with developments at the technological fron
tier. The authors' proposals, although not designed for that purpose, would
go a long way toward fashioning a PTO that could fill the vacuum.

